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Abstract Within the traditional telephone system a certain level of quality and se-
curity has been established over the years. If we try to use IP Telephony
systems as a core part of our future communication infrastructure (e.g. as
classical PBX enhancement or replacement) continuous high availabili-
ty, stable and error-free operation and the protection of the privacy of the
spoken word are challenges, that definitely have to be met.
Since manufacturers start deploying new end systems and infrastruc-
ture components rather fast now - a critical inspection of their securi-
ty features and vulnerabilities is mandatory. The critical presentation of
the theoretical background of certain vulnerabilities, testing and attacking
tools and the evaluation results reveals, that well-known security flaws be-
come part of implementations in the new application area again and the
security level of a number of examined solutions is rather insufficient.





IP telephony applications are considered to have a huge economic po-
tential in the near future. The role of IP telephony can be described as a
specific part of a continuously emerging scene of more general multime-
dia applications. Concerning signaling protocols, interfaces and imple-
mentation details, we currently face a lot of work in progress with high
dynamics and multiple concurrent approaches.
Security and privacy are mandatory requirements for this application
area. Unfortunately developers do not pay too much attention to these
features, they are often seen as a “add-on task”, following the implemen-
tation of the basic (communication) functionality.
Our paper tries to create security awareness in the field of IP telephony
and addresses mainly two target groups: First, potential consumers of IP
telephony solutions, who should be able to “ask the right questions” and
perform checks with the supplied tools. Second, developers (protocol de-
signers, implementors and vendors) of IP telephony equipment, that can
either fix problems in their current products and (even more important)
may reason about pro-active security approaches in their future designs.
From our point of view, presenting the information does not increase
the risk for current IP Telephony system installations. Both customers
and vendors will benefit, if security limitations are discussed before po-
tential attackers start exploiting them and the installed base (with severe
vulnerabilities) gets really large.
The shown vulnerabilities have not been published immediately after
discovery. On the contrary, we have informed the vendors in order to en-
able them to work on effective solutions for final products. As stressed in
[9] a skilled attacker has probably already discovered the described flaws.
Then concealing of the security problems would just cause the contrary
of the (perhaps initially good) intention not to spread the knowledge.
2. TERMINOLOGY AND EVALUATED
SCENARIO
A system component shows a (security) vulnerability if protected in an
insufficient way against abuse. Once advantage is taken of this vulnera-
bility, the security provided for the system in question is jeopardized [9].
In order to understand the potential reasons and nature of the vulnerabili-
ties to be shown, we will first describe the characteristics of the evaluated
IP Telephony scenario.
2.1. GENERIC IP TELEPHONY SCENARIO
Figure 1 shows the parts that are typically used to build an IP Tele-
phony scenario. It normally compromises - independent from the used
protocol (H.323, SIP or others) - a signaling plane, a media transport



















Figure 1 Generic IP Telephony Scenario
The signaling plane is used for transporting the necessary signaling
information between the components. After a call setup, the media trans-
port plane is used to carry the voice data between the components, e.g. ter-
minals or gateways. Normally the components have to be operated re-
motely, so there is also a need to transport management data. This could
be seen as a third plane, but this function is often considered as an addi-
tion to the signaling plane.
For a security assessment, a number of (related) facts have to be con-
sidered. First, both planes that are used, depend on the same infrastruc-
ture, the IP network. Compared to the conventional telephony in the Pub-
lic Switched Telephone Network (with SS#7), where there is a certain
level of isolation, this increases the risk of system misuse. In our scenari-
o there is no physical separation between the planes.
Second, the network infrastructure is not maintained or controlled by a
single authority or just a small (trusty-worth) set of providers. Signaling
and media plane might be based on untrusted network parts, components
and operators.
Finally the IP network, which is used by the signaling and media plane,
is also used by other services and both end system and infrastructure com-
ponents are often full featured computers able to fulfill many other tasks.
Based on these facts we can conclude that not only telephony relat-
ed security problems (e.g. possible missing privacy of the spoken word)
may occur. IP telephony systems are based on normal network and com-
puter systems and interfere with them. The resulting security problem
domain is considerably larger compared to a standard PSTN based tele-
phony system. We will furtheron concentrate on IP Telephony specific
problems though, and will e.g. not mention the fact, that routers or other
general infrastructure components are vulnerable as well.
2.2. VULNERABILITY TARGETS IN H.323
Figure 2 describes a scenario in which H.323 based components are
used. It is considered to be representative for common operational areas

















Figure 2 H.323 IP Telephony Scenario
We identify the following potential risks and derived points of attack:
Both the signaling or media transport plane can be target of an at-
tack. This involves integrity, confidentiality, authentication or non-
repudiation of the transported data.
Both the audio payload data but especially the signaling informa-
tion exchanged between the components is sensitive to eavesdrop-
ping, jamming and even active modification. The challenges be-
come even more evident if we consider an open environment where
finding, choosing and using services and transfer points from and
towards the PSTN (we can compare this to conventional ”Call Rout-
ing”) are subject to economic competition between various service
providers.
Compromising the identity of an end system or infra structure com-
ponent leads to additional risks even when using standard and non-
compromised signaling mechanisms. If a malicious user can reg-
ister with a H.323 Gatekeeper (or SIP server/registrar), he can po-
tentially gain the personality of the user whom he attacks. That in-
volves a potential invasion of privacy (since at least incoming calls
are routed to the attacker and may give him the knowledge who
calls) as well as the chance of miss-using services that are charged
for.
The specific functions of the IP telephony infrastructure compo-
nents might be target of an attack. For example we consider the
registration service as provided by a gatekeeper.
The components environment, hosting a specific IP telephony func-
tion can be target of an attack. This includes the management inter-
faces, used to configure the IP telephony function, which are also
hosted by the operating system.
Even systems and functions that are not directly involved can be
attacked. For example a IP telephony enabled firewall might be
weakened due to the fact that it supports IP telephony communi-
cation (and temporarily opens certain communication paths that
might be used for attacks instead of regular voice conversation).
The next section gives a selection of the examined vulnerability exam-
ples which can be arranged according to our classification.
3. CASE STUDIES
In the following we present selected vulnerabilities of a H.323 based IP
telephony scenario (Figure 3) that incorporates gatekeepers and gateways




















Figure 3 Evaluated Test Scenario
The conventional PBX components and their administrative IP access
points (that form further potential points of attack as well) are just shown
for completeness.
3.1. ATTACKING END SYSTEMS
Getting control of an end system.
IP telephony end systems will often be placed in publically accessible
places (e.g. offices or even on public floors). Once an attacker gets physi-
cal access to the examined IP telephone in our scenario, he is able to reset
it to its factory configuration. (In the later we show typical characteristics
of the vulnerabilities or code fragments in a framed example box.)
Instructions taken from the IP telephone manual
Restoring the factory settings
Enter the 6-digit password: 124816
Access to the Administration menu
In the as-supplied condition, the Administrators password is
123456.
Getting physical access to the telephones management
The example of providing backdoors or weak initial passwords is not
a unique flaw but has been examined for multiple components from dif-
ferent vendors. The remote management interface (via HTTP) that the IP
telephone uses is vulnerable to attacks as well. The administrator pass-
word is sent in plaintext which makes the communication vulnerable to
sniffing. Additionally (due to its limited length and restricted alphabet,
because it has normally to be typed in via the telephones keypad) the
administration password can also be attacked with a series of automated
brute-force trials.
Once initial access to the device is gained, its administrative password
for both local (manual) as well as remote WWW access can be set to a
value known and becomes usable for further malicious operations. The
device configuration is visible to an attacker and can be used for gain-
ing additional information about the attacked network, user identities and
E.164 numbers as well as for restoring values after an attack. In our ex-
ample details such as the IP phones IP address, its E.164 number and the
IP address of the H.323 gatekeeper(s) that it tries to register with, can
be obtained and changed. Doing so even allows an attacker to change a
phones capabilities in a way, that it registers with a different gatekeeper
which is under the attackers control. This gives this attacker reading and
even changing access to the IP telephony signaling and may be used for
getting information about communication relations (who calls whom),
enables calculated degradation or even denial of communication services
(the user is unable to receive calls from or originate calls to specific other
phones) or access to voice content for outgoing calls to PSTN participants
if those are routed via a H.323 to PSTN gateway of the attackers choice.
Obtaining administrative access to the device can even be used for
completely changing its firmware, that can be loaded from outside vi-
a the network. Though this (still, as long as no development APIs for
telephone firmware are available - which might change with upcoming
configurable ”Java-Phones”) means a very high effort for the attacker,
consequences are rather severe, because a new firmware placed on the
device could offer all the functionality that the original device had, while
providing permanent backdoors for later attacks.
DoS-Attack using IP telephony signaling.
The end systems we evaluated (both a commercial ”hard” phone and the
Open Source ohphone) were unable to withstand an attack that sends un-
expected or incorrect H.323 signaling PDUs. Those resulted in either a
temporary unavailability or even a total system failure with the device
locked up, crashing or rebooting.
In the case of a ”registration attack” - that we will describe later -
a malicious attacker can use a Denial of Service first, to (maybe even
just temporarily) suppress the packets from the original system in order
to start the de-registration / registration of another malicious end system
then.
Denial-of-Service Attack using general means.
The examined IP phone uses an integrated WWW server that allows to
manage the device and to query some of its settings. This WWW serv-
er and its implementation faults (though not a basic part responsible for
IP telephony functions of the device) makes it vulnerable for malicious
attacks. Using a URL with a sufficiently long length, the device can (de-
pending on the length of the URL string) either be made inoperable which
results in its total failure or rebooted.

uses standard TCP socket communication on port 80 (HTTP) 
...
memset(query string, 0x1, 256);
query string  256	
 0x0;
write(sock, query string, sizeof(query string));
...
Denial of Service using the phones HTTP server
For the attack just minimal skills of the attacker, simple tools (we have
performed the attack using either a standard browser, a telnet tool or a
tiny test program) and low effort are required, but they result in a total
loss of systems functionality and can be performed at all end systems of
an installation from a remote place at the same time.
3.2. ATTACKING THE USERS PRIVACY
IP telephony applications use RTP [7] packets transmitted via the UDP
protocol for carrying audio data streams. Though basic mechanisms for
using symmetrically encrypted [1] audio payloads in RTP packets are de-
scribed in an appropriate RTP profile [6], those are not widely used yet,
due to the lack of deployed key exchange or negotiation features within
the IP telephony signaling protocols. For a potential eavesdropper it is
necessary to identify the data streams that form the audio connection(s).
Since the ports used for that, are typically negotiated in a dynamic man-
ner this is not a totally straight-forward task. With the public availability
of IP telephony protocol stacks and an in-detail description of protocol
mechanisms it becomes more easy even for non-expert attackers though.
For investigation we developed and tested a tool that - after specifying
the characteristics of the users we observe (depending on the kind of sig-
naling and scenario e.g. H.323 with or without registration of symbolic
names at a Gatekeeper we can e.g. specify an E.164 number we want to
observe) - allows to monitor and / or record calls on the fly.

uses libpcap for packet capturing

...
#define RTP PAYLOAD OFFSET ff
...
while (!finished) fi
packet fl (u char ffi ) pcap next(pcap, &pkthdr);
...
write(audio fd, (unsigned char ffi )packet  RTP PAYLOAD OFFSET,
rtp payload size);
...
Playing audio data by sniffing the (unprotected) RTP payload
Since a structured cabling with dedicated lines towards each partici-
pant instead of a shared ethernet is usually considered a basic precon-
dition for a sufficient data throughput, low audio packet delay and loss
bounds, people often argument, that the use of switches instead of hubs
limits the problem of unauthorized access to the data connections. Recent
publications have shown though, how vulnerable also such configurations
are to attacks. After sending faked ARP replies to a switch it starts send-





When registering an H.323 device, it establishes a mapping compromis-
ing its E.164 number and a voluntary number of additional symbolic
names (so called aliases) with its IP address at the gatekeeper. This
mechanism is part of the H.225 RAS (Registration, Admission and S-
tatus) signaling and allows for a comparable easy auto-configuration and
portability of devices within a given local environment as well as a certain
mobility.
The gatekeeper typically implements a certain policy which describes,
whether just pre-configured sets of E.164 numbers/symbolic names and
IP addresses are allowed to register or every potential end-system can.
This is a purely administrative decision and out of the scope of the H.323
standard specification itself. In the best case, gatekeepers allow to choose
which policy to use in a granular way and are pre-configured with a rather
strict policy that forbids arbitrary access. For the systems we evaluated
that is not the case though.
In traditional PBX systems, rights (as for instance whether a certain
person is allowed to originate long distance or international calls) are usu-
ally bound to user identities. This mechanism without additional (e.g. cryp-
tographic) protective means can be exploited by ”stealing” or faking user
identities. If the registration is not restricted by any means the registration
mechanism can be exploited for either (miss-)using the communication
services which often includes calling to external parties via IP telephony
to PSTN gateways without paying for that service, for just causing costs
by calling expensive external service numbers or even calling dedicated
numbers that their operator has a benefit from.
!"
uses OpenH323 for PDU generation
"!
!"
we show the unregistration part
"!
!"






H225 TransportAddress ipAddress &
h225 transportaddress ipaddress #
(UnRegReq.m callSignalAddress[0]);
h225 transportaddress ipaddress.m ip[0] # ip[0];
h225 transportaddress ipaddress.m ip[1] # ip[1];
h225 transportaddress ipaddress.m ip[2] # ip[2];
h225 transportaddress ipaddress.m ip[3] # ip[3];
h225 transportaddress ipaddress.m port.SetValue(port);
...




As a minimal means of protection only de-registration requests carry-
ing the IP address of the previously registered participant could be ob-
served while others should be disregarded or may even trigger warnings
or alarms for the systems administrator. Since the (de)registration IP ad-
dress is carried in the (usually unprotected) payload of an H.323 PDU,
they can easily be faked. Additional checks (e.g. the test whether the P-
DUs source IP address corresponds to the correct entity) have either to
be evaluated for their general applicability (e.g. in the case of proxying
instances or additional gateway originating messages) or can be broken
by using spoofing at the IP layer. (This poses some more burden at an
attacker, but can and has been done.)
Only cryptographic methods such as the H.323 protocol extensions de-
scribed in H.235 [2] and Annex F form a better basis for protective mech-
anisms. They are not implemented in the devices we evaluated though.
Denial of Service targeting the Gatekeeper.
We were able to prevent all (both commercial and Open Source) observed
gatekeepers from fulfilling their regular tasks by sending them a large
number of either regular (cyclic registration and de-registration of ter-
minals) or irregular H.323 PDUs. This makes the IP Telephony service
una% vailable either for a certain period or in general (if the gatekeeper is
forced to crash).
It must be mentioned that for those DoS-attacks only a comparable
small bandwidth is necessary (since we are attacking the signaling) and it
is difficult to protect a gatekeeper (e.g. by means of a firewall) if it needs
regular communication relationships with ”outside” parties for its regular
tasks (e.g. if outside clients are allowed to regularly call).
4. CONCLUSIONS
4.1. ASSESSMENT RESULTS
The scenarios that we described have been evaluated within our uni-
versity environment and we believe them to be rather realistic, once IP
phones (at the current security level) would be deployed regularly within
publically accessible network segments of our campus. This deployment
within just one single network (then used for both data as well as voice
traffic) has been determined as on of the potential reasons for starting to
use IP telephony - so scenarios planning to use two separate (then both IP
networks) are considered to be not realistic.
Even if a certain level of ”isolation” could potentially be obtained by
using VLAN techniques this would also limit the promising chances for
close computer and telephony interaction which forms the basis for new
innovative services.
It should be mentioned that - differing from the situation with a con-
ventional PBX, which compromised highly specialized equipment and
is usually not available for attackers with an ”average background” - IP
infrastructure components such as H.323 gatekeepers or H.323 to PSTN
gateways are available even as Open Source [3][4] implementations and
can easily be obtained, adapted and deployed.
4.2. POTENTIAL COUNTERMEASURES
The paper intentionally concentrates on the search (based on theoret-
ical analysis of the protocols and scenarios), description and practical
exploit of vulnerabilities. We just give a short reference to potential coun-
termeasures which can be be classified as either
short-term and more or less just ”bug-fixing” (which is definitely
necessary but will not change the problem situation in general) or
longer-term and comprehensive (which we see as a general must




Both the IETF and ITU recently show more efforts to provide standards,
that also cover the security aspect. For example the ITU provides some
extensions to the H.323 framework, which specify how security can be
added [2]. For SIP, cryptographic authentication and privacy features are
defined within the base RFC already. An overview about these security
related extensions to the IP telephony standards is given in [5]. As shown
in this contribution, these protocol extensions are necessary to be able to
solve some security problems, but do not provide a general and automatic
security solution to broken system designs.
Establishing a Security Improvement Feedback-Loop.
In [8] we introduced the concept of a Security Improvement Feedback-
Loop (SIF) which is a systematic way of understanding security weak-
nesses and elaborating efficient solutions. The SIF concept consists of
four stages:
Observation: security weaknesses of existing systems are observed
and reflected in various forms such as mailing-lists, newsgroups,
and articles.
Information Retrieval: information is gathered from different sources.
In case of electronic documents this can be done automatically.
Form-based interfaces can be used to guide human users by enter-
ing information that comes from non-digital sources.
Screening: the data is transformed according to a uniform, highly
structured data scheme, as this is more suitable for further machine-
based processing. It is possible to apply screening filters in order
to determine the relevance of information that will be stored in vul-
nerability databases.
Analysis and Utilization: as we have described in [9], appropriate
data mining procedures help to identify and improve patterns that
are in turn used to engineer new or to improve existing systems. For
example this knowledge can be used for the elaboration of security
design patterns, security guidelines or as input for security tools.
Thus the security of new and existing systems will be improved as
known errors should not occur again. Now the feedback-loop is
closed.
The data-mining approach reveals valuable insights for security im-
provement. Our long term goal is to identify a set of comprehensive
security' patterns for secure distributed application domains, with IP tele-
phony just one of those.
4.3. FINAL REMARKS
The observed design flaws and potential misbehavior of IP telepho-
ny solutions are in their majority not due to limitations or shortcomings
within the technology or its architectures and signaling protocols itself,
but result from severe design, implementation and policy faults.
With just ”basic attacking components” and without special precon-
ditions (most attacks were performed from user space and without even
physical access to the attacked network) we could show vulnerabilities
that reach from the invasion of the users privacy over service misuse and
fraud to the total degradation of services. Both commercial equipment
as well as popular Open Source implementations (such as the OpenH323
stack, that a lot of people now start basing their future solutions on) have
been shown to be vulnerable in the same way. Basically all the attacks
that we theoretically planned in the first evaluation step succeeded.
The shown problems can and must be fixed by the manufacturers of
the equipment and should definitely be avoided in future designs. We
strongly believe that a critical view on the current situation is helpful in
order to avoid potential threats to user as well as operator and vendor
interests once the equipment is deployed in larger quantities.
The authors are working on improving the situation in close contact
and cooperation with the component manufacturers and system integra-
tors. Interested parties are explicitly encouraged to contact the authors for
the source code and (Linux) executables for all the described checks and
attacks. A number of details on the potential exploits are - due to their
sensitivity - available on request only and will be publically available just
after they have been fixed.
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